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LIVING DISCREETLY: A CATCH 22 IN 
REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATIONS ON 
THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
INTRODUCTION 
eventy six countries around the world criminalize homosexuality, 
maintaining severe punishments for consensual sexual activity be-
tween adults of the same sex.1 Of these countries, five still punish homo-
sexual acts with the death penalty.2 Other countries have “morality laws” 
against “anti-social” or “immoral” behavior, “causing a public scandal,” 
etc., that are used by the police to persecute gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender individuals.3 Such laws enable law enforcement officials to 
invade private residences of individuals suspected of engaging in same 
sex activity;4 these morality laws can result in exemption from punish-
ment for arbitrary arrests made by law enforcement on the basis of alle-
gations and rumors with few, if any, consequences for mistreatment.5 
Even when such laws are not implemented or enforced, they influence 
societal attitudes, constructing a social stigma that often legitimizes vi-
olence and abuse against people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender (“LGBT”), or anyone who engages in homosexual conduct.6 
In fact, laws of this nature often encourage state and private actors to 
engage in violence against sexual minorities and enable impunity for 
such actions.7 Thus, escaping from their country of origin and seeking 
asylum may be the only option for victims facing these kinds of situa-
tions. 
While political asylum may offer hope of refuge and protection, the 
asylum process has many problems, especially for those individuals ap-
                                                          
 1. For a survey of laws prohibiting homosexual conduct, see DANIEL OTTOSSON, 
INTL. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS & INTERSEX ASS’N, STATE-SPONSORED 
HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME SEX ACTIVITY BETWEEN 
CONSENTING ADULTS 7–45 (2010), available at 
http://www.msmasia.org/tl_files/2010%20resources/10-
06_resources/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2010-2.pdf.  
 2. Id. at 45. 
 3. International: Criminalization and Decriminalization of Homosexual Acts, INTL. 
GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMM’N (July 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/817.html.  
 4. Amnesty Intl., Love, Hate and the Law: Decriminalizing Homosexuality, 1, 8, 
30/003/2008 (2008), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/003/2008/en/e2388a0c-588b-4238-9939-
de6911b4a1c5/pol300032008en.pdf. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 7. 
 7. Id. 
S 
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plying for refugee status on the basis of sexual orientation.8 The largest 
obstacle to overcome for any claimant in an asylum case is credibility, 
regarding whether or not the applicant will actually face persecution if 
returned to their country of origin.9 Because asylum seekers can only 
rarely corroborate the specific elements of their claim, refugee determi-
nations often depend largely on the applicant’s word alone.10 For sexual 
minorities, overcoming this credibility burden is made even more diffi-
cult because sexual orientation is generally not a visible or obvious cha-
racteristic;11 unlike qualities of other oppressed groups, sexual orienta-
tion is one that must be voluntarily revealed.12 However, many lesbians 
and gay men are not openly homosexual,13 continuing to remain discreet 
in order to “pass” as heterosexual and avoid the danger that comes with 
disclosure of their sexual identity.14 Thus, the rejection15 of the discretion 
requirement—that sexual minorities could, and therefore should, aid in 
their own protection from persecution by being discreet about their sex-
                                                          
 8. Nicole LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, AM. SOC’Y INTL. L. INSIGHTS, July 30, 2009, 
intro. [hereinafter LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims], availa-
ble at http://www.asil.org/files/insight090730pdf.pdf.  
 9. Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility As-
sessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 367–368 (2003). 
 10. Jenni Millbank, ‘The Ring of Truth’: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in 
Particular Social Group Refugee Determinations, 21 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 1–3 (2009) 
[hereinafter Millbank, Ring of Truth]. 
 11. Laurie Berg & Jenni Millbank, Constructing the Personal Narratives of Lesbian, 
Gay and Bisexual Asylum Claimants, 22 J. REFUGEE STUD. 195, 197 (2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a 
“Particular Social Group” and its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 65 (2008).  
 14. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 198. 
 15. The High Court of Australia rejected the widespread trend in earlier cases in 
which decision makers could expect sexual minorities to conceal their identities in order 
to avoid persecution. See Appellants S395/2002 and S396/2002 v Minister for Immigra-
tion and Multicultural Affairs (2003), 216 CLR 473 (Austl.) [hereinafter Appellants 
S395/2002 and S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs]. In this 
case, the court concluded that this discretion requirement was itself a form of persecution. 
Id. The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity has also made it clear that a requirement to hide one’s sexual orientation 
or gender identity may approximate persecution. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees 
[UNHCR], UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity, ¶ 25 (Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidance Note], availa-
ble at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5660.html. In this Guidance Note, the 
UNHCR states that taking reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm is never a precon-
dition to protection. Id. 
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uality16—of early cases has had minimal, if any, impact on the ability of 
LGBT claimants to succeed in sexual orientation based asylum claims.17  
Although courts have begun to move away from judicially mandated 
discretion, the reality is that many homosexual individuals continue to 
live discreetly because “societal homophobia” prevails.18 That in turn 
means that problems of credibility continue to prevail in asylum claims 
based on sexual orientation. Such problems are multiplied by stereotypi-
cal images of LGBT people, such as expecting a flamboyant or feminine 
demeanor in gay men, or masculine, butch demeanor in lesbian women.19 
Misconceptions of this nature are further compounded by cultural mi-
sunderstandings of social context and conditions in the country of ori-
gin20 as well as the decision makers’ preconceived notions about sexual 
orientation influenced by the societal attitudes of their own country.21 
Without a better, clearer understanding of sexual orientation and gender 
identity, decision makers will continue to deliver inconsistent and inco-
herent LGBT asylum claims.22  
This Note argues that the success rate of refugee claims based on sex-
ual orientation will not improve, even as more countries begin to reject 
discretion reasoning, unless refugee decision makers can better under-
stand the specific social contexts experienced by applicants in their home 
country and are better able to actively suppress their false assumptions in 
assessing credibility. Part I provides an overview on the rights and status 
of refugees and what is required of applicants to succeed in an asylum 
claim. Sexual orientation as a basis upon which to claim asylum general-
ly, and in Australia and Canada specifically, is discussed. Part II ex-
amines the problem of discretion prevalent in earlier cases of asylum re-
lated to sexual orientation and gender identity. More specifically, it dis-
cusses an Australian case that rejected that notion and analyzes its im-
                                                          
 16. Christopher N. Kendall, Lesbian and Gay Refugees in Australia: Now that ‘Act-
ing Discreetly’ is No Longer an Option, Will Equality be Forthcoming?, 15 INT’L. J. 
REFUGEE L. 715, 716 (2003). 
 17. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 1. 
 18. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 197. 
 19. UNHCR Guidance Note, supra note 15, at 16.  
 20. Arwen Swink, Queer Refuge: A Review of the Role of Country Condition Analysis 
in Asylum Adjudications for Members of Sexual Minorities, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 251, 253–254 (2006). 
 21. Kagan, supra note 9, at 371–372. A refugee applicant’s personal and emotional 
impressions on an adjudicator and the adjudicator’s “gut feelings” can have a substantial 
impact on the outcome of a case. Id. at 374. In addition, social perceptions may not al-
ways capture the “true complexity of an individual’s identity.” Marouf, supra note 13, at 
59.  
 22. Marouf, supra note 13, at 59.  
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pact. Finally, Part III explains the causes of the issues in credibility as-
sessment and what should or can be done to overcome them. In doing so, 
it briefly compares the cases in Australia and Canada to demonstrate that 
even Canada, the world’s leader in progressive asylum policies,23 cannot 
completely avoid reliance on stereotypical assumptions in adjudicating 
refugee claims based on sexual orientation and gender reliance.24 
I. BACKGROUND ON ASYLUM LAW 
A. Overview of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees25 and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees26 codify the rights and status 
of refugees.27 These international instruments define the term “refugee”28 
and establish the non-refoulement principle29 that obligates signatory 
                                                          
 23. Stephen Pischl, Circumventing Shari’a: Common Law Jurisdictions’ Response to 
Persecuted Sexual Minorities’ Asylum Claims, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 425, 
431 (2006). 
 24. See, e.g., Khrystych v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [2005] 
F.C. 498 (Can.) [hereinafter Khrystych v. Canada]; Mora v. Canada [2004] F.C. 1158 
(Can.). Note that Canadian gender guidelines direct attention to the need for sensitivity 
and training but they have not been utilized in claims by lesbians or gay men. See Nicole 
LaViolette, Gender-Related Refugee Claims: Expanding the Scope of the Canadian 
Guidelines, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 169, 178–188 (2007). 
 25. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
 26. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Dec. 16, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The Protocol extends the scope of the 1951 
Convention beyond its former geographic and temporal limits. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 27. LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 1.  
 28. A “refugee” is “any person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 1951 Conven-
tion, supra note 25, art. 1 A(2). 
 29. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, in THE 
NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980’S 103, 103–104 (David A. Martin ed., 
1986). The non-refoulement principle is a basic human rights concept, providing the low-
est level of refugee protection. See Erik D. Ramanathan, Queer Cases: A Comparative 
Analysis of Global Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L. 
J. 1, 4 n.14 (1996). States party to the Convention must pass “enabling legislation that 
provides for adjudications and designations such as ‘asylee’ or ‘permanent residency.’” 
Id.  
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states30 to refrain from returning a refugee to a country where his life or 
freedom would be threatened.31 Additionally, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (“UNHCR”) produced a hand-
book that tries to coherently define the central provisions of these in-
struments,32 “offering the basis for intergovernmental consensus on 
many interpretation issues.”33 
The Convention does not protect all of the refugees around the world, 
regardless of the extent of their misery.34 Individuals “seeking asylum 
must satisfy two main legal tests [to succeed in a claim]: (1) they must 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution; and (2) they must subs-
tantiate that the persecution they fear is on account of their race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group.”35 In addition, the asylum seeker must show that their home coun-
try is “unwilling or unable to offer protection.”36 Many countries have 
interpreted these provisions to include applicants claiming refugee status 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.37 Since the early 1990’s, 
countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand 
have granted refugee status to individuals who fear persecution based on 
their sexual orientation or gender identity.38 Most early asylum opinions 
                                                          
 30. According to the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 147 countries 
that are parties to either the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol as of October 1, 
2008. UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol (Oct. 1, 
2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf.  
 31. 1951 Convention, supra note 25, art. 33, ¶ 1. 
 32. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/IP/4/EngREV.1 (Jan. 1, 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook], available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e13b4.pdf.  
 33. Ramanathan, supra note 29, at 3–4.  
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 1; 
see also 1951 Convention, supra note 25, art. 1, ¶ A(2). “A ‘particular social group’ nor-
mally comprises persons of similar background, habits or social status. A claim to fear 
persecution under this heading may frequently overlap with a claim to fear of persecution 
on other grounds, i.e., race, religion or nationality . . . Mere membership of a particular 
social group will not normally be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There 
may, however, be special circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient 
ground to fear persecution.” UNHCR Handbook, supra note 32, ¶¶ 77–79.  
 36. LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 1–
2.  
 37. For a survey of countries that grant asylum to sexual minorities, see Sexual Mi-
norities and the Law: A World Survey [Updated July 2006], ASYLUMLAW.ORG, 
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/sexualminorities/World%20SurveyAIhomosexuality.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Sexual Minorities and the Law: A World Survey].  
 38. Id. 
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relating to sexual orientation and gender identity in such jurisdictions 
addressed the question of whether LGBT individuals constitute a particu-
lar social group39 rather than whether homosexuals experience a well-
founded fear of persecution in their countries of origin.40 In addition, in 
1995 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) 
recognized that gay men and lesbians formed a particular social group 
and could therefore be granted refugee status on that basis under the 
terms of the Convention.41 In particular, the UNHCR stated that “persons 
facing . . . serious discrimination because of their homosexuality, and 
whose governments are unable or unwilling to protect them, should be 
recognized as refugees.”42 While the UNHCR’s statements are not bind-
ing on the courts, they may be useful in determining whether a person is 
a refugee as well as in interpreting the terms of the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol.43 Accordingly, at least eighteen countries now recog-
nize that sexual minorities make up a social group within the meaning of 
the Convention’s definition of refugee and are prepared to grant asylum 
                                                          
 39. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 163–164 (1991); UNHCR 
Guidance Note, supra note 15, ¶ 32. While sexual orientation is now recognized as a 
particular social group, it should also be noted that LGBT refugees may also show that 
their persecution is based upon political opinion. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion by UNHCR 
to the Tokyo Bar Association Regarding Refugee Claims Based on Sexual Orientation, ¶ 
6 (Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter UNHCR Advisory Opinion], available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4551c0d04.html. “For the purposes of the 1951 
Convention . . . the term ‘political opinion’ [is] broadly interpreted to . . . include opi-
nions on sexual orientation and gender identity.” UNHCR Guidance Note, supra note 15, 
¶ 30. A claimant’s political opinion need not have been expressed while he/she was still 
living in his/her home country; it was sufficient to show that those strongly held beliefs 
would now subject him/her to persecution, if returned, because the opinion has come to 
the persecutor’s attention by implication from his/her escape from the country. See also 
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 32, ¶¶ 94–96 (describing the status of refugees that are 
sur place). Along these lines, it is possible that LGBT refugees could also seek asylum on 
the basis of religious persecution. See Ramanathan, supra note 29, at 5; UNHCR Guid-
ance Note, supra note 15, ¶ 31. 
 40. Ramanathan, supra note 29, at 4. 
 41. Amnesty Intl., Crimes of Hate, Conspiracy of Silence: Torture and Ill-Treatment 
Based on Sexual Identity 1, 26, 40/016/2001 (2001), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT40/016/2001/en/bb63ae8f-d961-11dd-a057-
592cb671dd8b/act400162001en.pdf. 
 42. Kristen L. Walker, Sexuality and Refugee Status in Australia, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE 
L. 175, 179 (2000) (citing UNHCR, Protecting Refugees: Questions and Answers (Feb. 1, 
2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b779dfe2.html). 
 43. Id.  
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to LGBT people, provided that they satisfy the Convention’s aforemen-
tioned legal tests.44  
B. Sexual Orientation-Specific Claims of Asylum 
Both Canada and Australia have precedent which states that sexual 
orientation can form the basis for refugee protection.45 Decisions in these 
countries focus on the importance of social group eligibility.46 In Canada, 
the Federal Court Trial Division’s decision in Timothy Veysey v. Com-
missioner of the Correctional Service of Canada provided the foundation 
for eventually treating sexual orientation as an “immutable characteristic 
capable of defining a social group.”47 While this case did not involve 
refugee law, the court’s definition of “particular social group” in finding 
a violation of the equality rights provision of Canada’s Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms is applicable in this context.48 There, the court explained 
that the grounds, such as race or ethnic origin, identified in Section 15 of 
the Charter as prohibited grounds of discrimination, imply the characte-
ristic of immutability, a characteristic that “would also clearly apply to 
sexual orientation, or more precisely to those who have deviated from 
accepted sexual norms.”49  
Canada eventually incorporated this idea into its refugee law in the Su-
preme Court’s 1993 decision of Ward v. Canada (Minister of Employ-
ment & Immigration) decision, which provided an expansive definition 
of the term “particular social group.”50 There, the court reviewed earlier 
                                                          
 44. According to Sexual Minorities and the Law: A World Survey, supra note 37, last 
updated in July of 2006, the eighteen countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. It should 
be noted that some of these countries also allow applicants to claim transgender discrimi-
nation or persecution as the basis for their refugee status. See id. 
 45. Swink, supra note 20, at 252. 
 46. Ramanathan, supra note 29, at 13–19.  
 47. HATHAWAY, supra note 39, at 163. In this case, a man alleged a breach of his right 
to equality because prison officials refused to extend the conjugal visitation policy to 
homosexuals. Id.  
 48. Id. at 163–164. 
 49. Id. at 164. Another feature that is common to the grounds listed under the Charter 
which would also apply to sexual minorities is that the groups have been “victimized and 
stigmatized throughout history because of prejudice, mostly based on fear or ignorance.” 
Id. 
 50. Ward v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1993] 2 S.R.C. 689 
(Can.). This case had nothing to do with sexual orientation based persecution. However, 
it provides an important comprehensive definition of what constitutes a particular social 
group in Canada. See id. 
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Canadian and American precedents and identified three possible catego-
ries of social groups:  
(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; 
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fun-
damental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to 
forsake the association; and 
(3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to 
its historical permanence.51 
The court specifically noted that the first category encompasses indi-
viduals persecuted on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.52 
This idea, that homosexuals constitute a particular social group, was con-
sidered by the courts as early as 1991,53 and became widely accepted 
after the highly-publicized 1992 decision In re Inaudi.54 In that case, an 
Argentine man was granted asylum on the grounds that he was a homo-
sexual man and was thus a member of a particular social group that was 
subject to persecution.55 The court determined that “homosexuality is an 
immutable characteristic, [which] alone suffices to place homosexuals in 
a particular social group [and] [e]ven if homosexuality were a voluntary 
condition, it is one so fundamental to a person’s identity that a claimant 
ought not to be compelled to change.”56 In granting this kind of refugee 
status, Canada became the first North American jurisdiction to offer sex-
                                                          
 51. Id. at 715. 
 52. Id. at 716. 
 53. In a 1991 case involving a Uruguayan gay man, only one of two Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada panel members accepted the notion that “homosexuals . . . are 
definable, and form a particular social group. It is their right of conscience or human 
dignity that these individuals should not be required to change their sexual preference if 
persecuted because of their sexual preference.” Sean Rehaag, Patrolling the Borders of 
Sexual Orientation: Bisexual Refugee Claims in Canada, 53 MCGILL L.J. 59, 62–63 
(2008). However, this panel member agreed with the other in holding that the applicant 
did not qualify for refugee status. Id. 
 54. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 Re GJ, New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals Au-
thority, 30 August 1995 51–52 (citing In re Inaudi, No. T91–04459, [1992] C.R.D.D. No. 
47 (Apr. 9, 1992)) [hereinafter Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 Re GJ]. 
 55. Ramanathan, supra note 29, at 14 (citing In re Inaudi, No. T91–04459, [1992] 
C.R.D.D. No. 47 (Apr. 9, 1992)).The court relied on an earlier German asylum case that 
recognized gay men as a social group to reach its conclusion that homosexuality denoted 
a social group within the refugee definition. Id. 
 56. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 Re GJ, supra note 54, at 52. It should be noted that 
there was a dissent in this case, but it questioned the credibility of the facts presented 
rather than questioning the issue of whether sexual orientation was an appropriate ground 
for asylum. Id. 
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ual orientation-based asylum,57 setting an important international 
precedent.58 
As in Canada, the earliest Australian refugee claims relating to sexual 
orientation and gender identity also dealt, for the most part, with the is-
sue of social group qualification.59 Australia considered the concept of 
membership in a particular social group in Morato v. Minister for Immi-
gration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, in which the Federal 
Court held that a person must “belong to or [be] identified with a recog-
nizable or cognizable group within society that shares some experience 
in common” in order to be a member of a particular social group.60 Tak-
ing cues from Canada’s jurisprudence in this area, the court refers to the 
“relative immutability of sexual orientation” and the “stigmatization 
throughout history of those who depart from accepted sexual norms.”61 
The Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”) extended this notion 
to include sexual minorities as a particular social group for refugee status 
determination purposes under the 1951 Convention.62 The RRT first 
granted an applicant asylum on the basis of sexual orientation in 1994.63 
This case involved a homosexual Iranian male whose father had discov-
ered his sexuality and threatened to report him.64 After concluding that 
homosexuals are capable of constituting a particular social group, the 
RRT granted the claimant refugee status.65  
The high court upheld the RRT’s approach to sexual orientation-based 
asylum claims in Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs.66 In that decision, the court expressed the view that a group can 
                                                          
 57. Pischl, supra note 23, at 431 (citing Brian F. Henes, Comment, The Origin and 
Consequences of Recognizing Homosexuals as a “Particular Social Group” for Refugee 
Purposes, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 377, 387 (1994)). 
 58. Canada was not the first country ever to grant asylum to homosexual claimants. 
Pischl, supra note 23, at 446 (citing Brian F. Henes, Comment, The Origin and Conse-
quences of Recognizing Homosexuals as a “Particular Social Group” for Refugee Pur-
poses, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 377, 383–385 (1994)). Before Canada, Germany and 
the Netherlands had offered refugee status to applicants claiming persecution on the basis 
of sexual orientation in the late eighties. Id. 
 59. Ramanathan, supra note 29, at 16. 
 60. Morato v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] 
111 ALR 417, 432 (Austl.).  
 61. N93/02240 [1994] RRTA 232 (21 Feb. 1994).  
 62. Walker, supra note 42, at 180 (citing N93/00846 [1994] RRTA 347 (8 March 
1994); N93/02240 [1994] RRTA 232 (21 Feb. 1994)). 
 63. Swink, supra note 20, at 253.  
 64. N93/02240 [1994] RRTA, supra note 61. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] 190 CLR 225 
(Austl.). It should be noted that this was not a sexual orientation-based claim for asylum. 
250 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
constitute a particular social group under the Convention definition even 
if its distinguishing characteristics did not have a “public face.”67 It is 
“sufficient that the public [is] aware of the characteristics or attributes 
that, for the purposes of the Convention, unite and identify the group.”68 
The court further stated that “[i]f the homosexual members of a particu-
lar society are perceived in that society to have characteristics or 
attributes that unite them as a group and distinguish them from society as 
a whole, they will qualify for refugee status.”69 The courts in Australia 
have since recognized, both implicitly and explicitly, that sexual minori-
ties may be considered a particular social group for the purposes of refu-
gee status determinations.70  
II. WELL FOUNDED FEAR AND THE PROBLEM OF DISCRETION 
Recognizable as a particular social group, sexual minorities will be 
granted refugee status upon proving a well-founded fear71 of persecu-
tion72 as “only those who face a genuine risk of persecution in their 
country of origin are entitled to the protections established by the Con-
vention.”73 In order to constitute persecution, the harm feared by the ap-
plicant must be serious.74 This kind of serious harm may involve grave 
human rights violations, including a threat to life or freedom, in addition 
to other kinds of formidable harm, “as assessed in light of the opinions, 
feelings and psychological make-up of the applicant.”75 While the re-
quirement that harm be serious leads to the distinction between persecu-
                                                                                                                                  
Id. at 227–228. However, the court explored the definition of particular social group and 
discussed in dicta that homosexuals as a group could define a particular social group 
under the Convention. Id. at 249–250. 
 67. Id. at 250. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. The court also noted that it was not necessary for the group to have attributes 
that they are perceived to have. Id. 
 70. Walker, supra note 42, at 180. 
 71. HATHAWAY, supra note 39, at 65. “Well-founded fear” generally consists of two 
requirements: (1) the applicant must “perceive herself to stand in ‘terror of persecution’ . 
. . [and] it must be an extreme form of anxiety that neither feigned nor overstated, but is 
rather sincere and reasonable” under the circumstances; and (2) “this perception of risk 
must be consistent with available information on the conditions in the state of origin, as 
only those persons whose fear is reasonable can be said to stand in need of international 
protection.” Id.  
 72. LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 2.  
 73. HATHAWAY, supra note 39, at 65. 
 74. LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 3.  
 75. UNHCR Guidance Note, supra note 15, at 7.  
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tion and discrimination,76 a pattern of discrimination could, cumulative-
ly, reach the level of harm necessary to be considered persecution.77 
Whether an applicant has sufficiently established a well-founded fear of 
persecution to succeed on an asylum claim under the Convention is a 
complex factual and legal issue.78  
Early cases of asylum claims based on sexual orientation engaged in 
“discretion reasoning.”79 This idea implemented a “reasonable expecta-
tion that persons should, to the extent that it is possible, cooperate in 
their own protection, by exercising self-restraint such as avoiding any 
behavior that would identify them as gay.”80 A common notion that was 
widespread among refugee decision-makers, especially those in Austral-
ia,81 was that displays of sexual behavior in public between members of 
the same sex could attract disapproval,82 thus inviting persecution;83 it 
was thought that, unlike other minorities targeted for persecution, lesbian 
women and gay men could avoid the harms of persecution because they 
have the “option” of being discreet about their sexuality.84  
This idea of discretion undermines the purpose of the Convention by 
putting the responsibility of protection on the applicant who is required 
to ensure their own safety by keeping important aspects of their lives 
                                                          
 76. LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 3. 
Note that there has been a tendency for decision makers to distinguish between persecu-
tion and the less serious harm of discrimination as the situation of homosexual individu-
als has been changing—as some countries are becoming more accepting of deviations of 
the “norm,” others continue to severely repress sexual diversity. Id. 
 77. UNHCR Guidance Note, supra note 15, at 7.  
 78. LaViolette, The UNHCR’s Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 3.  
 79. Jenni Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief: Recent Trends in Refugee Deter-
minations on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom, 13 
INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief].  
 80. Id. See also V96/05496 [1998] RRTA 196 (15 Jan. 1998) (stating that “the right 
to free expression of sexuality does not extend so far as a right to publicly proclaim one’s 
sexuality and consequently it is reasonable to expect a homosexual to be discreet, if ne-
cessary, in the sense of avoiding overt manifestations of homosexuality such as public 
embracing or the public proclamation of his sexuality;” while this might be “irksome and 
unjust,” it would not “infringe any basic human right”). 
 81. See Applicant LSLS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] 
FCA 211 (Austl.); see also Applicant WABR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultur-
al Affairs [2002] 121 FCR 196 (Austl.). 
 82. Jenni Millbank, Imagining Otherness: Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexuality in 
Canada and Australia, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 144, 151 (2002) [hereinafter Millbank, Im-
agining Otherness]. 
 83. Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 79, at 3. 
 84. Kendall, supra note 16, at 717. 
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secret, rather than putting the responsibility on the receiving country.85 In 
fact, any “decision that requires ‘discretion,’ . . . read silence and invisi-
bility, in order to avoid abuse does little more than prop up those inequa-
lities that the Convention seeks to address and which are at the core of 
both homophobia and sexism.”86 By requiring discretion, the scope of 
protection offered under the Convention differs in relation to the five 
articulated grounds by “protecting the right to be openly religious but not 
to be openly gay or in an identifiable same-sex relationship.”87  
Discretion reasoning illustrates society’s so-called “proper place” of 
homosexuality, as something that is necessarily private and must be hid-
den rather than as something crucial to an individual’s identity.88 While 
the explanation for the development of this approach is understandable, 
discretion reasoning is seriously flawed89 and, therefore inappropriate in 
refugee status determinations.90 It leads to incorrect assumptions and the 
misrepresentation of country information on the objective risk of perse-
cution for sexual minorities, making it almost impossible for claims to 
succeed.91 As “this line of reasoning assume[s] that applicants should 
and would conform to their culture or government’s oppressive regimes 
in order to avoid harm,” the decision-makers in these cases failed to as-
sess the magnitude of the potential harm and balance that harm in eva-
luating whether there was a real risk of persecution if the person was re-
turned to the country of origin.92 
                                                          
 85. Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 79, at 3. Requiring applicants 
to live discreetly imposes a burden on asylum seekers who fear persecution on grounds of 
sexual orientation that is not imposed on asylum seekers who fear persecution on other 
grounds. Appellants S395/2002 and S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicul-
tural Affairs, supra note 15, at 475.  
 86. Kendall, supra note 16, at 717. It should also be noted that requiring discretion 
essentially requires “the muzzling of a central aspect of a person’s identity.” Id. 
 87. Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 79, at 3. The five Convention 
grounds are race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular 
social group. See 1951 Convention, supra note 25, art. 1, ¶ A(2). 
 88. Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 79, at 3. “The discretion ap-
proach explicitly posited the principle that human rights protection available to sexual 
orientation was limited to private consensual sex and did not extend to any other manife-
station of sexual identity.” Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See UNHCR Guidance Note, supra note 15, at 7 (explicitly stating that being 
forced to hide or renounce one’s sexual orientation and gender identity, “where this is 
instigated or condoned by the state,” may rise to the level of persecution). 
 91. Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 79, at 4. 
 92. Id. at 4. This approach precludes an assessment of risk to the “extent that on occa-
sion there [i]s literally no assessment at all of the country situation and the risk of harm to 
someone who was identified as gay or lesbian.” Id. 
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Especially prevalent in Australia, where the Refugee Review Tribunal 
denied refugee status based several times on the notion that sexual mi-
norities are able to avoid persecution by living discreetly,93 discretion 
reasoning has been rejected by the High Court of Australia in its Decem-
ber 2003 decision Appellants S395/2002 and S396/2002 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.94 In that case, two gay men from 
Bangladesh sought asylum based on membership of a particular social 
group and the interpretation of persecution was the central issue.95 Spe-
cifically, the question was whether it was valid law for decision makers 
to consider whether sexual minorities could be or should be required to 
be discreet and secretive in their home countries in order to avoid or les-
sen the risk of persecution.96 The Tribunal rejected their claims, and 
while it accepted that it is impossible to live openly gay in Bangladesh, it 
ultimately concluded that they were not entitled to refugee protection.97 
Finding that the appellants had not suffered serious harm because of their 
homosexuality, the Tribunal expressly stated that they had “clearly con-
ducted themselves in a discreet manner and there is no reason to suppose 
that they would not continue to do so if they returned home now.”98 On 
appeal, the High Court by a four to three majority, held that the tribunal 
had erred and flat out rejected the discretion reasoning approach as 
invalid.99 The court concluded that persecution does not cease to be per-
secution for the purpose of the Convention because those that are perse-
cuted can and should eliminate the harm by taking action to avoid the 
harm within their country of nationality.100 The court further stated that 
                                                          
 93. Kendall, supra note 16, at 716. The issue of discretion was first raised in Australia 
in the case of a gay Chinese man who had been married to a woman before fleeing. 
V93/00242 [1994] RRTA 1150 (10 June 1994). In that case, the Tribunal found that it 
was not unreasonable to require an exercise of discretion and that this limitation of his 
sexual expression did not constitute persecution. Id. 
 94. Appellants S395/2002 and S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicul-
tural Affairs, supra note 15. 
 95. Id. at 482–486. 
 96. Id. at 476. The question ultimately comes down to whether the discretion re-
quirement is so serious in nature that it is intolerable or whether a denial of civil rights is 
“so complete and effective that it actually and seriously offends a real aspiration so held 
by an asylum seeker that it can be fairly said to be integral to his or her human dignity.” 
Id. 
 97. Id. at 480. 
 98. Id. Central to this finding was the assumption that homosexual men in Bangla-
desh will not be targets of persecution if they act discreetly. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 485. In such situations, the requirement of well-founded fear of persecution 
is satisfied as that well-founded fear is the claimant’s fear that he or she will suffer harm 
unless that person takes measures to avoid the harmful conduct. Id. This is true because 
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whether the applicant disclosed his or her identity as a homosexual and 
attracted the attention of persecutors is immaterial; if the harm inflicted 
falls under a Convention reason and is serious enough to constitute per-
secution, the homosexual person is entitled to protection under the Con-
vention.101  
III. ISSUES OF CREDIBILITY LESSEN THE REJECTION OF DISCRETION 
REASONING’S IMPACT 
Discretion reasoning ultimately led to the failure of decision makers to 
consider whether there was a real chance of persecution of the person 
upon repatriation.102 This failure was particularly evident where the ac-
tions of the persecutors already caused the affected individual to modify 
his or her conduct by hiding his or her sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity.103 In such cases, “there is a natural tendency for the tribunal of fact 
to reason that, because the applicant has not been persecuted in the past, 
he or she will not be persecuted in the future.”104 Detracting from the 
“future-focused nature”105 of the well-founded fear test, discretion rea-
soning makes it almost impossible for a claim based on sexual orienta-
tion to succeed unless the applicants were able to demonstrate that they 
had been persecuted in the past.106 Thus, the Australian decision107 re-
jecting the idea of discretion reasoning in asylum determinations shows 
promise of providing a solution to a variety of flaws, not just in the dis-
cretion approach but in asylum determinations based on sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity in general. But while the case is a progressive 
step in the right direction, and case law since the decision has shown 
some positive impact,108 it does not address the issues of credibility that 
exist in making refugee status determinations based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity. 
                                                                                                                                  
in the majority of cases, the applicants have acted and carried out their conduct the way 
they did only because of the threat of harm. Id. at 486. 
 101. Id. at 486.  
 102. Id. at 485. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief, supra note 79, at 4. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Appellants S395/2002 and S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicul-
tural Affairs, supra note 15. 
 108. See N04/49627 [2005] RRTA 7 (25 Feb. 2005) (stating that having to hide one’s 
homosexuality to reduce the risk of harm is itself persecutory); see also N05/50670 
[2005] 88 (19 May 2005) (framing the hiding of one’s sexual orientation and thus living 
discreetly as leading a double life rather than a normal life). 
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Problems of credibility continue to arise in sexual orientation based 
asylum claims because many homosexual individuals continue to live 
discreetly and often times “pass” as heterosexual individuals due to the 
prevalence of heterosexuality as a societal “norm.”109 As the applicant’s 
personal stories are the basis of the claim and the “foundation of virtually 
all of the applicant’s evidence,”110 hearings in the refugee forum almost 
always consist entirely of the applicants’ personal narratives of their ex-
periences.111 Thus, the assessment of credibility is inevitably susceptible 
to subjectivity as it requires one human being, the decision maker, to 
evaluate the credibility of another human being, the claimant. Decision 
makers are required to “assess cases that are constructed upon the frail 
foundation of human descriptions of extreme experiences.”112 In this 
context, “[e]motional impressions of a person and ‘gut feelings’ can have 
a substantial impact”113 on the outcome of a case.114 The problem lies in 
the decision makers’ false assumptions about the conduct and appearance 
of homosexual individuals.115 Because such preconceived notions about 
sexual orientation and gender identity are shaped by the societal attitudes 
of the decision makers’ home countries,116 it is crucial to educate and 
train them in what sexual identity is and how it comes to develop, espe-
cially in individuals who identify as homosexual.  
A. Demeanor as a Poor Indicator of Credibility 
The necessity for better training and guidelines to help decision makers 
make more informed, objective decisions is evident from the continued 
reliance on demeanor, including physical appearance and perception of 
manner.117 Evaluations of demeanor are poor indicators of truthfulness 
because they are extremely dependent on the decision maker’s and the 
                                                          
 109. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 197. 
 110. Millbank, Imagining Otherness, supra note 82, at 154. 
 111. Id. The UNHCR Handbook states that asylum applicants should be given the 
benefit of the doubt as they are unlikely to be able to prove every element of their claim. 
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 32, at 32–33. This benefit of the doubt should be given 
only when the decision maker is “satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility.” Id. at 
32.  
 112. Rosemary Byrne, Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings: Guid-
ing Standards From the International Criminal Tribunals, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 609, 
612 (2007). 
 113. Kagan, supra note 9, at 371. 
 114. Id. Oral testimonial evidence is the “least credible and most impeachable form of 
evidence.” Byrne, supra note 109, at 612. 
 115. UNHCR Guidance Note, supra note 15, at 16–17.  
 116. Kagan, supra note 9, at 371–372.  
 117. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 3.  
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applicant’s personal and cultural temperaments.118 Influenced by stereo-
typical images of the effeminate gay man or the masculine, butch lesbian 
woman,119 decision makers often tend to make assessments such as “no 
signs of being gay,”120 or “looked gay.”121 Such statements in asylum 
opinions are problematic because society’s social perceptions often do 
not capture the “true complexity of an individual’s identity.”122 In fact, 
individuals have “multiple, dynamic social identities that vary according 
to context, and different aspects of identity may be more or less promi-
nent in any given situation.”123 Thus, in a potentially nerve-wracking 
formal hearing, refugee applicants may be unable to confidently and ac-
curately speak about their traumatic and painful experiences.124 Adding 
further complication is the fact that many homosexual individuals con-
tinue to live secret lives in order to avoid persecution in their countries of 
origin.125 In this reality, refugee applicants making claims on the basis of 
sexual orientation and gender identity still face an unsolvable dilemma126 
in which it is unlikely that they will pass the demeanor test: on the one 
hand, acting discreetly, while no longer a requirement in assessing refu-
gee status, helps applicants avoid a threat of persecution in their home 
countries, yet on the other, it inhibits them from “looking” gay as many 
have spent countless years “passing” as straight.127 
In addition, applicants in sexual orientation based claims are likely to 
find answering questions about their sexuality very difficult128 due to 
feelings of shame and self-hatred,129 particularly when the questions are 
                                                          
 118. Walter Kalin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in 
the Asylum Hearing, 20 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 230, 232–234 (1986).  
 119. UNHCR Guidance Note, supra note 15, at 16–17.  
 120. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 3. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Marouf, supra note 13, at 59.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Kagan, supra note 9, at 373–374.  
 125. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 197; Millbank, From Discretion to Disbelief, 
supra note 79, at 5–6.  
 126. Kendall, supra note 16, at 716. While the rejection of discretion reasoning is a 
“win” for LGBT individuals, there is still a long way to go before these individuals will 
be welcomed into their receiving countries. Id. 
 127. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 197. 
 128. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 4. 
 129. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 197. Applicants from especially repressive 
societies may have only talked to a handful of people, or none at all, about their sexual 
orientation prior to making a claim. Id. at 198. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the 
interview will affect whether the applicant feels comfortable and safe in revealing his or 
her identity. Id. 
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sexually explicit and asked by an authority figure.130 Because decision 
makers often interpret hesitation or lack of detail in an applicant’s re-
sponse to questioning as indicative of lying,131 this kind of demeanor 
evaluation will lead them to discredit the applicant’s stories.132 This 
problem is exacerbated when applicants need to speak through an inter-
preter, which disrupts the communication and severely impedes the 
translation of both verbal and nonverbal cues.133 Such inherent difficul-
ties in evaluating an applicant’s demeanor and conduct make it easy for 
decision makers to fall back on assumptions, instincts, or generalizations 
in reaching their decisions,134 resulting in “a simplified impression” of 
the individual.135 Despite the unreliability of demeanor in assessing truth-
fulness, 136 it continues to be recognized as an important aspect of credi-
                                                          
 130. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 4. Refugee applicants from coun-
tries where homosexual persecution is sanctioned by the state or encouraged will find it 
especially hard to disclose their identities as it will be difficult for them to trust that “state 
officials could be anything other than hostile” to such a disclosure. Berg & Millbank, 
supra note 11, at 198. 
 131. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 4. The reason behind this presump-
tion is that decision makers have “pre-formed” expectations of how homosexual identity 
is expressed and understood without taking into account the diverse range of backgrounds 
and cultures from which the refugee applicants come. Id. See also Marita Eastmond, Sto-
ries as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research, 20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 
248, 251 (2007) (stating that narratives must be analyzed in the social and political con-
texts that influence the refugee applicants’ lives as they are not “transparent renditions of 
reality” but rather, require interpretation). 
 132. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 4. 
 133. Guy Coffey, The Credibility of Credibility Evidence at the Refugee Review Tri-
bunal, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 377, 381 (2003). Asylum claimants come from countries 
with “norms of verbal and nonverbal expression[s]” that the decision makers are unfami-
liar with, thus making an accurate evaluation of demeanor highly unlikely. Id. at 382. In 
Kathiresan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Gray J stated that “it is 
all too easy for the ‘subtle influence of demeanor’ to ‘become a cloak, which conceals an 
unintended but nonetheless decisive bias.’” Id. at 381–382 (citing Kathiresan v Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 6, 4 
Mar. 1998) (Austl.)). In fact, there are real “risks associated with making credibility as-
sessments . . . on the basis of demeanor and conduct” as there is little empirical support 
that evaluators are able to reliably assess the truthfulness of an “individual’s claims on 
the basis of demeanor and manner of presentation alone.” Id. 
 134. Marouf, supra note 13, at 59. This is due to “the sheer complexity of social life, 
paired with an all-too-common lack of motivation or capacity to process others in a com-
plex manner, [which] can lead to focusing on just one of the many available categoriza-
tions.” Id. at 59–60. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Kagan, supra note 9, at 373. 
258 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
bility assessment since decision makers continue to rely upon it, 137 thus 
demonstrating the need to educate decision makers.  
B. Inconsistency Does Not Always Equal Fabrication 
Consistency, or the lack thereof, is another aspect of credibility as-
sessments that leads to problems and, in effect, minimizes the impact of 
the rejection of the discretion reasoning approach. Decision makers fre-
quently state inconsistency as the reason for rejecting a refugee appli-
cant’s claim.138 Inconsistencies often occur within an applicant’s person-
al statements about their experiences or between each re-telling of their 
accounts.139 Because adjudicators believe inconsistency “goes to the 
heart of whether a person’s account is coherent,”140 they often conclude 
that an inconsistency in evidence necessarily calls the applicant’s credi-
bility into question.141 However, such an automatic conclusion fails to 
consider the fact that there are a number of perfectly legitimate possibili-
ties other than deliberate falsification that may give rise to inconsisten-
cies.142 An inconsistency or contradiction does not necessarily signify 
fabrication as if often results from an applicant’s repeated questioning;143 
since such questioning is unlikely to occur the same way on each occa-
sion during the course of an applicant’s claim,144 it is almost impossible 
                                                          
 137. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 3.  
 138. Kagan, supra note 9, at 379. 
 139. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 6.  
 140. Kagan, supra note 9, at 379. 
 141. See e.g. V99/09946 [2000] RRTA 935 (29 Sept.r 2000) (concluding that the “in-
consistencies between the applicant’s evidence attached to his application and his written 
and oral evidence submitted to the Tribunal” undermined his credibility). In addition, 
there is a presumption that people who are telling the truth and remembering events that 
really happened are able to accurately recollect them the same way each time. Kagan, 
supra note 9, at 379. 
 142. Jane Herlihy, Peter Scragg & Stuart Turner, Discrepancies in Autobiographical 
Memories—Implications for the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: Repeated Interviews 
Study, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 324, 326–327 (2002). In fact, decision makers, themselves, rec-
ognize that contradictions are inevitable in every case. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, su-
pra note 10, at 6 (citing Cecile Rousseau & Patricia Foxen, Constructing and Decon-
structing the Myth of the Lying Refugee, in LYING AND ILLNESS 74 (Els van Dongen & 
Sylvie Fainzang eds., 2005)). 
 143. Kagan, supra note 9, at 377. 
 144. Id. The applicant may first submit a personal statement followed by an interview 
by the asylum office; the applicant may then have to testify and be cross-examined. Id. 
By the end, the applicant will have told his or her story, both orally and verbally, several 
times over a period of many months. Id. 
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for the applicant, or anyone else, to answer each question in exactly the 
same manner. 145 
In addition, delayed revelation of information pertinent to claims of 
persecution plays a role in leading decision makers to conclusions of in-
consistency, and, ultimately rejections of applicants’ claims.146 While 
this kind of delay may raise serious questions about the credibility of an 
applicant,147 it is important to remember, as the UNHCR constantly re-
minds,148 that claimants who have suffered serious trauma and human 
rights violations may delay revealing their experiences.149 As in the de-
meanor context, refugee applicants may fear authority figures, may want 
to avoid reliving painful experiences, or may feel uncomfortable reveal-
ing information about a very private aspect of their lives, particularly in 
an unfamiliar and unwelcoming setting.150 Decision makers must under-
stand that while delayed revelation of important facts may sometimes be 
the result of fabrication, it can also result from “hyperamnesia . . . the 
observation that people remember more details with repeated recalls.”151 
Given such a range of possible reasons for delayed revelation of relevant 
information, decision makers should not immediately draw adverse infe-
rences, automatically assuming that delayed disclosure equals falsifica-
tion.152 
                                                          
 145. Herlihy, Scragg & Turner, supra note 142, at 326–327. In this study, researchers 
interviewed participants, asking the same questions weeks and months later, and ulti-
mately found disparities from the first to the last interview to exist for every participant. 
Id. Upon further examination, the researchers discovered that the discrepancies between 
interviews had most to do with peripheral details. Id. at 326. See also Juliet Cohen, Ques-
tions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of Recall in the Testimony of 
Asylum Seekers, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 308 (2001) [hereinafter Cohen, Questions of 
Credibility] (conducting a review of cognitive memory research and concluding that “it is 
almost impossible to maintain absolute consistency, especially if it is a long time since 
the events to be recalled.”); Juliet Cohen, Errors of Recall and Credibility: Can Omis-
sions and Discrepancies in Successive Statements Reasonably be Said to Undermine 
Credibility of Testimony?, 69 Medico-Legal Journal 25, 27–34 (2001) [hereinafter Co-
hen, Errors of Credibility] (showing that personal narratives may change, without neces-
sarily being an indication of lying, because memory is affected and influenced by many 
factors). 
 146. Kagan, supra note 9, at 380. 
 147. Coffey, supra note 133, at 382–385. 
 148. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 32, ¶¶ 196–199.  
 149. Coffey, supra note 133, at 382. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Cohen, Questions of Credibility, supra note 145, at 297. 
 152. Coffey, supra note 133, at 382–385. 
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C. All Surrounding Circumstances Should be Considered in an Assess-
ment of Whether an Individual’s Expression of a Homosexual Identity is 
Plausible  
Difficulties arise in assessing whether an individual’s account of a ho-
mosexual self-identity is actually plausible because it is unclear as to 
what exactly constitutes a plausible expression of a homosexual identi-
ty.153 “Given the great diversity of human experience and understanding 
of sexual identity both within and across genders, cultures and other di-
vides,”154 lesbians and gay men do not necessarily acknowledge and act 
on their sexual orientation in an identical manner.155 As a result, an as-
sessment of plausibility is often derived from false assumptions of what 
is likely to be the “typical evolution”156 of an individual’s homosexual 
identity.157 Relying on inferences of how people would or should behave 
in certain situations, decision makers frequently make plausibility judg-
ments that are based more on speculation rather than upon actual evi-
dence.158 This problem is aggravated by a lack of objective evidence to 
prove a refugee applicant’s identification as a homosexual individual.159 
As in the demeanor context, plausibility determinations are based on 
broad generalizations and stereotypes of gay culture.160 For example, in a 
2004 Canadian decision, a court held that an applicant who engaged in a 
relationship with a woman after arriving in Canada could not be gay be-
cause it was implausible that a homosexual would carry on such a rela-
tionship.161 In other cases, decision makers have evaluated the truthful-
ness of applicants’ claims of homosexuality by testing their familiarity 
with the gay lifestyle and scene in the country to which they escaped.162 
In that context, claimants are expected to know about the gay nightclubs 
and other publicly gay venues in their country of relocation as proof of 
                                                          
 153. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 8.  
 154. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 203. 
 155. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 8. 
 156. Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 204. 
 157. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 8.  
 158. Id. 
 159. Millbank, Imagining Otherness, supra note 82, at 154. As already stated, an ap-
plicant’s claim is almost entirely based on his/her personal narrative of his/her expe-
rience. Id. 
 160. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 9. 
 161. Khrystych v. Canada, supra note 24; Berg & Millbank, supra note 11, at 199 
(citing Khrystych v. Canada [2004] RPDD No. 339 (15 April 2004)). In another case, the 
court found that it was not plausible for a woman to have her first lesbian relationship in 
her 50’s because “most people discover their sexuality at a much younger age.” Millbank, 
The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 10. 
 162. Millbank, The Ring of Truth, supra note 10, at 9.  
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their “gayness.”163 Such expectations164 do not take into account the fact 
that many homosexual individuals live discreetly,165 adopting conceal-
ment and avoidance strategies to escape persecution and the stigma that 
comes with being labeled a homosexual.166 Because such strategies “in-
volve selectively disowning their sexual orientation to themselves and to 
others,”167 it is highly likely that homosexual refugee applicants will con-
tinue to live their lives “passing” as straight by engaging in heterosexual 
relationships or simply choosing not to openly participate in the gay life-
style.168 Thus, presumptions based upon inaccurate “rational percep-
tions”169 of what constitutes a plausible homosexual identity and how it 
is likely to be expressed make it even more apparent that decision makers 
must receive education and training before they are expected to adjudi-
cate asylum claims based on sexual orientation. 
CONCLUSION 
Although more countries are likely to follow Australia in its explicit 
rejection of the discretion requirement,170 the success rate of refugee 
claims based on sexual orientation will not improve unless refugee deci-
sion makers can better understand the specific social contexts of clai-
mants’ home countries and are better able to actively suppress their false 
assumptions in assessing credibility. The 2003 Australian decision reject-
ing the discretion reasoning approach in sexual orientation-based asylum 
determinations was a step in the right direction for sexual minorities, but 
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 164. Id. These expectations involve a “two-fold assumption: this is what our gay 
people do, therefore your doing likewise is proof of gayness, and also: if you have come 
from a place of oppression/covert experience of your sexuality, then the inevitable out-
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 165. Millbank, Imagining Otherness, supra note 82, at 197. 
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on Refugee Claims, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
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it did not resolve all of the issues inherent in these types of asylum 
claims.171 By failing to address issues of credibility, that decision neg-
lected the fact that hearings in refugee forums frequently consist almost 
entirely of the applicants’ personal stories.172 The assessment of appli-
cants’ credibility is therefore inevitably subject to the decision makers’ 
preconceived notions about sexual orientation and gender identity as in-
fluenced by the societal attitudes of the decision makers’ home coun-
tries.173 Such overbroad generalizations and stereotypes combined with 
the fact that sexual minorities are not openly homosexual,174 make it es-
pecially difficult for homosexuals to overcome the credibility obstacle.175   
Because refugee status determinations occur in a context where “emo-
tional impressions”176 and “gut feelings”177 will most likely have a sub-
stantial impact,178 it is extremely important that decision makers are tho-
roughly trained and educated in what constitutes sexual identity and how 
it comes to develop, especially in individuals who identify as homosex-
ual. They should be aware that difficulties arise in evaluating demeanor 
which makes it easy for them to fall back on oversimplified social per-
ceptions and inferences in reaching their decisions,179 resulting in an in-
accurate portrayal of the individual.180 Acknowledging such downfalls in 
using demeanor as a guide in credibility assessments should help deci-
sion makers understand that a single, uniform expression of homosexual-
ity does not exist.181 Decision makers must also realize that inconsisten-
cies in personal narratives are to be expected and should not automatical-
ly disqualify an applicant as incredible since there are a variety of expla-
nations for inconsistent stories.182 Finally, decision makers must fully 
understand that sexual minorities may often continue to live their lives 
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discreetly183 and in turn remember that unfamiliarity with the gay culture 
of their receiving country or participation in heterosexual relationships in 
the past does not necessarily disprove their “gayness.”184  
This kind of education and training for the decision makers is crucial 
because many countries around the world continue to persecute sexual 
minorities and punish them for homosexual activity185 and escaping to 
seek asylum in another country may be the only option for the victims 
facing these kinds of situations. Credibility is already a difficult obstacle 
to overcome186 for any asylum claimant without the added complication 
that LGBT applicants face because homosexuality is an invisible, non-
obvious characteristic.187 It is made even less visible because societal 
homophobia continues to exist, causing many homosexuals to continue 
to live discreetly.188 Thus, without training to educate decision makers on 
how to suppress misconceptions about homosexuality, refugee applicants 




                                                          
 183. This is true despite the ruling rejecting the notion that homosexuals should have 
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